Shades of 1933 in German state elections

Opinion: On Sunday, Germany experienced a political earthquake. For the first time since 1933, a far-right party, the Alternative for Germany (AfD), became the largest party in a state election. In Thuringia, the AfD won 32.8 percent of the vote, gaining 9.4 percentage points on its previous performance.
This happened mere days after a knife attack at a festival in Solingen killed three people. The suspect is a 26-year-old Syrian, Issa Al H, who has lived in Germany since 2022 despite his claim for asylum being rejected. Unsurprisingly, this alleged terrorist attack dominated the final week of the campaign. It put immigration and security at the centre of debate – right where the AfD likes to have it.
No wonder the AfD did well, and not just in Thuringia. In Saxony, the far right polled 30.6 percent finishing narrowly behind the Christian Democratic Union, which received 31.9 percent of the vote. Meanwhile, the three parties forming the federal government in Berlin (SPD, Greens and FDP) did not manage to score even 15 percent combined.
Immigration and migrant crime have long been political issues in Germany, but Solingen was a sudden and dramatic reminder of the problems facing the country.
Since Angela Merkel dramatically opened the borders in 2015, Germany has taken in about 2.5 million asylum seekers, overwhelming the system. In 2023 alone, Germany received 352,000 new asylum claims, a 51 percent increase on the previous year.
The Solingen attack laid bare multiple failings in Germany’s immigration policy. The system for deporting rejected asylum seekers is dysfunctional, as evinced by the alleged attacker’s two-year stay after his claim was rejected. In 2023, more than 200,000 people were meant to be deported, but only 16,430 left the country.
Integration presents another significant challenge. Though many migrants adapt well to their new environment, some struggle with life in a secular, liberal democracy. This sometimes leads to criminal behaviour, and sometimes also to political and religious radicalisation. Unfortunately, that seems to be the case with the alleged Solingen terrorist – and it went unnoticed by the authorities.
Adding fuel to this political fire are troubling crime statistics. Young men, regardless of where they come from, are more inclined to commit crimes than other demographics. However, that does not explain the overrepresentation of migrants in these statistics.
In 2022, foreigners, who make up 14.4 percent of the population in Germany, were responsible for 31.9 percent of all crimes. Even more alarming are the figures for serious offences: 36.6 percent of rapes, 41.1 percent of murders and manslaughters, and 55.1 percent of organised crime cases involved foreign perpetrators. (Incidentally, that is the opposite of New Zealand’s experience, where migrants seem less likely to be involved in crime than those born here.)
Germany’s long-standing issues with migration and the difficulty of integrating asylum seekers have clearly pushed the AfD to new heights. But the AfD was not the only party with a strong showing.
Adding to the political upheaval, the newly formed Alliance Sahra Wagenknecht (BSW) made a strong showing, securing 11.8 percent in Saxony and 15.8 percent in Thuringia.
The BSW results were remarkable for a party not even a year old and with a mere 700 members. Blending left-wing economic policies with conservative social views and a pro-Russian foreign policy, it has emerged as a significant player.
Forming governments in Thuringia and Saxony will now prove exceptionally difficult. In Thuringia, a coalition excluding the AfD would need to span the entire political spectrum – the Left’s ex-communists, Social Democrats, BSW’s pro-Putin populists and the centre-right Christian Democrats. In Saxony, CDU leader Michael Kretschmer will have to form a similar coalition, albeit without the Left.
These events, Solingen and the elections, will have far-reaching political implications. Chancellor Olaf Scholz is urging for stricter legislation on crimes involving weapons and the treatment of asylum-seekers, and the opposition CDU is advocating for expedited deportations and enhanced border security.
The AfD capitalises most effectively on immigration concerns. For years, mainstream parties have sidestepped frank discussions about immigration problems, fearing accusations of racism. Their unwillingness to act created an opportunity that the AfD eagerly took advantage of, positioning itself as the lone party ready to tackle these challenges head-on. It is textbook populism.
However, it would be a mistake to attribute the AfD’s rise solely to immigration and crime concerns. Their success also reflects a broader disillusionment with established politics, particularly pronounced in eastern Germany where many feel neglected and left behind by the political mainstream. It signifies a growing east-west divide and a challenge to the post-reunification political consensus.
Germany’s traditional parties have a tough battle ahead of them. They must address legitimate worries regarding immigration and security – but without the shrill rhetoric of the AfD. And they must do so within the confines of European and German constitutional law, which is more demanding than simply shouting populist slogans from the sidelines.
Beyond migration policy, crime and terrorism, Germany’s entire party-political system has become unstable.
For Chancellor Scholz, his SPD and his coalition government, these results are a disaster. Scholz’s attempts to address migration issues were too timid and came too late. He must now find a way to reconnect with voters, especially in eastern Germany, or risk being swept away in next year’s federal election.
Meanwhile, the Greens and FDP, Scholz’s junior partners in the federal coalition, face existential questions. Their poor showing in these state elections will lead to internal debates about their role in the coalition and their overall political strategy. The FDP, in particular, might wonder if it should pull out to secure its longer-term survival.
The emergence of the BSW as a significant force could also reshape left-wing politics in Germany, potentially challenging the SPD and the Left Party in future elections, at state and federal levels.
The centre-right CDU finds itself in a particularly delicate position. It needs to balance its traditional pro-Western stance with a need to form coalitions in eastern states. The BSW’s insistence on ending arms deliveries to Ukraine as a condition for coalition talks will create tension between state and federal CDU policies.
Over the coming year, en route to the 2025 general election, the political dynamics observed in Saxony and Thuringia will shape the parties’ strategies on a national scale.
If federal coalitions must involve BSW, as those in Saxony and Thuringia will, Germany will be a different country, particularly when it comes to defence and security.
For now, the other parties have ruled out a cooperation with BSW in Berlin. But after this election weekend, all bets are off in German politics.
Dr Oliver Hartwich is Chief Economist with the New Zealand Initiative, a business-funded think-tank. Its members are listed on its website here